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 The way we actually started was talking about time … we share a sense of 
 time. 
 (Wilson quoted in interview 2012)  
 
 Time in music is duration.  
 Philip Glass (quoted by Safir, 2012, 16)  
 
Einstein on the Beach, premiered in 1976, attained legendary status amongst 
contemporary operatic work. Subsequent revivals, though all sell-outs, have been 





production agency, is touring the fourth revival internationally.  
 Having seen the1992 and now the present production, I remain fascinated by 
this work’s capacity to shape our sense of its duration (it lasts just under five hours) 
and also to induce a temporal response which has few precedents. It defies prosaic 
analysis, incorporating disparate elements which seem to have no narrative, or 
biographical relevance. The title merely refers to a photograph of Einstein standing 
by the shore, seen by the work’s auteur Robert Wilson, who, working with the 
composer Philip Glass,  decided on Einstein as a subject because ‘Einstein 
embodied ... [the] mythic gods of our time’ (Wyndham 1992: 12). This celebrity, 
earned by revolutionary yet recondite physical research, offered Glass and Wilson 
the freedom  to create a ‘portrait of Einstein’ that dispensed with ‘plot, narrative, 
development, all the paraphernalia of conventional theater’, and instead to suggest 
‘a poetic vision’(Glass 1995: 32) able to receive whatever interpretation the audience 
might bring. The work merges vocals, visuals, dance and instrumentation to create a 
heterogeneous, surreal entertainment, involving sophisticated sound and lighting 
technology, sets of austere power, and (presently) requiring twelve singers, eleven 
dancers, eight instrumentalists, five performers and a production crew of twenty-six.  
 Its musical idiom had its beginnings in the mid-sixties, when Glass worked 
with the Indian sitar player Ravi Shankar. In contrast to post-Renaissance Western 
musical tradition, he recalls, ‘I discovered that a piece of music could be organized 
around the idea of rhythm rather than harmony and melody as I had been taught’ 
(Shyer 1989: 120), a changed prioritization which enabled the inception of what was 
later termed musical minimalism. Glass’s discovery did not entail superficially 
‘orientalising’ features or purposes; he intended ‘a self-referential musical language 
... in essence, abstract’ (Tricycle 1999: 321) and avoided the notion of ‘meditation 
(inducing) music’ (Tricycle 1999: 319), which he consigned to ‘new-age’ styles.   
 Glass has been equally responsive to other, specifically Western, cultural 
sources, which have attempted to introduce new modes of temporality in aesthetic 
encounter, namely visual artists such as Stella, LeWitt, Judd and Morris (to whom 
collectively the term ‘minimalist’ was originally applied), and dramatists such as 
Beckett, Brecht and Genet (Tricycle 1999: 319-321). If one can generalize across 
media, all of these figures conceived their work not as ‘drawing in’ spectators to 
identify with some feature or character, where the structure of the work would 





directive and inconclusive phenomena which allow the spectator to bring whatever 
interpretation completes them as works. Glass’s Parisian experience of writing music 
for Beckett’s Play (1965) seems to have crystallized his rejection of what could be 
called ‘hegemonic’ determinants of what and when an audience should emote (Glass 
1995: 35). In contrast to a temporal alignment, close to being simultaneous, of 
dramatic stimulus and planned-for response, he envisaged a hermeneutic 
convergence, where the time taken to construe some meaning for what happened on 
stage, was, in itself, part of that happening.  
 Clearly such a stance explains why Glass and Wilson liked the ‘open-
endedness’ of the subject of Einstein. Glass’s distaste for authorial hegemonism 
extended into the process of creation, where his relationship with Wilson was far 
more reciprocal than might be normal between composer and librettist or 
dramaturge. Their fundamental ‘assumption that the audience itself completed the 
work’ (Glass 1988: 34-35) led both to work in a way which avoided narrative 
pressure; even before composition, structure and timings were exactly determined, 
but the emotional content of scenes was never discussed.  
 Wilson, author, architect, artist and educationalist, recruited collaborators, 
notably Lucinda Childs, a founder of the Judson Church Dance Theatre, who created 
the choreography and also some repeated text. He also included material by 
Christopher Knowles, a gifted autistic youth with whom Wilson had worked for some 
time (Simmer 1976: 106), whose fragmented but hauntingly poetic style seems 
almost a direct literary counterpart to minimalist technique. Additional texts were by 
Samuel Johnson, an elderly man who presented himself for audition off the streets. 
Wilson himself supplied vocal texts used throughout the opera, based on numbers 
and solfège (‘do, re, mi ...’) syllables. When numbers are used, they represent the 
rhythmic structure of the music. When solfège is used, the pitch structure of the 
music is presented, ‘in either case the text is not secondary or supplementary, but is 
a description of the music itself’ (Glass, 1978: 67-68).  
 Rather than explaining content to collaborators, Wilson would provide 
sketches. Even the published performance edition is predominantly nonverbal, 
comprising 113 of these arranged serially, combined with score, texts, and 
choreographic diagrams, instantiating Wilson’s ambition to present a spectacle which 
cannot be contained in language alone (Owens 1977: 24-25). Dance was conceived 





embraces fluid and rigid extremes in a style he explicitly calls ‘mechanical’ 
(Obenhaus 1985), from a ‘modern dance’ idiom reminiscent of Cunningham or even 
Graham, to a robotic attitudinising to which Artaud’s term ‘hieroglyphic choreography’ 
could be applied. Often there are simultaneous different speeds of movement on 
stage, some slower and some as rapid as the musical pulse. 
 Despite diverse and eclectic materials, Wilson’s theatrical sensibility did not 
integrate them into a monovalent whole, as one dramatic ‘metalanguage’. Instead, 
by creating seemingly autonomous but hermetic theatrical Bilden, or multi-media 
tableaux, the audience is left free to imaginatively combine separate meanings 
polyvalently, emancipated from the  directorially specified interpretations of what 
Wilson has called the ‘fascist directing and acting’ of Western theatre today (Dyer 
1985: A4). 
 Glass’s thoughts on received notions of temporality in music similarly reject 
quasi-narrative devices. He sees the rise of Romantic programme music and 
concerti as having encouraged identification with the soloist as ‘the alter ego of the 
composer’ and of the listener too (Roddy 1999: 171), making musical development a 
‘narrative mechanism’, a ‘model’ of the ‘real world’, where ‘musical time is an 
allegory of real world time. I call that colloquial time ... the world you and I live in 
when we have our love affairs and our horses win at the races’ (171 my stress). 
Glass acknowledges that audiences sense in his work ‘extended time, or loss of 
time, or no sense of time whatever’ (172), attributing this to the aforementioned  
‘focus on structure rather than theme ... the way some music has now of drawing 
people into a different world without time. And without boredom’ (175). Whilst 
eschewing characterizations of such ‘timelessness’ as ‘metaphysical ’ or ‘mystical’,  
he concludes merely, ‘music structures itself in time as to create independent 
coordinates of its own ... one has an authentic experience of time that is different 
from the time that we normally live in’ (Cunningham 1999: 163-4).  
 It is not difficult to see in this attitude a precise musical counterpart to the 
effect on us of Wilson’s collage-like dramatic procedures, one of sustained 
‘defamiliarization’ and Glass himself has cited Brecht as a ‘big influence’ (Tricycle 
1999: 320). Glass’s and Wilson’s oeuvre implicitly invites non-verbal, non-rational 
modes of interpretation. Hallucinations and daydreams, forms of non-linear, non-





Interpretations of these are at least intersemiotic (see Broadhurst 1999, 2007) but 
may also be (to appropriate a theological term) apophatic, resistant to verbalisation.  
 A common reaction to Einstein (which I felt again recently), is that it does not 
feel like almost five hours of performance; by contrast to the real Einstein’s 
conjecture of what would be experienced when travelling at near light-speed, our 
subjective sense of duration has apparently accelerated whilst ‘objective’ time has 
continued normally. This overall effect embraces various strata of other sensations, 
which I propose to analyse in detail. In conformity to the hermeneutic position 
sketched above, what I offer is an analysis of my experience of the staging, which 
does not pretend to examine music, movement or text in a way removed from their 
performance.  
 As Glass says, the structure of this work creates its own temporal 
coordinates. I compare the effect on me of Einstein in performance with that of a 
vastly different, narrative-based work of comparable length, Wagner’s Parsifal, which 
really does seem to occupy four hours of experienced time, setting a libretto text of 
sixty-five pages. Einstein, with no narrative, and experientially so much shorter, is 
barely fourteen pages, but seems devoid of any musical padding. I think the 
experiential difference lies in what I call internal discreteness. Parsifal is a ‘through –
composed’ work, not divided into separate recitatives or arias, unrolling in continuous 
slow-moving exchanges and set-pieces. Einstein unfolds in a tautly organised 
scheme of four acts, each of two and lastly three scenes’ length, each act preceded 
and followed by transitional passages which Glass, alluding to the anatomical joint, 
calls ‘knee plays’. So there are in all fourteen sections of differing modes of 
performance. When interviewed at the recent London opening, Wilson informed us 
that he envisioned the meticulously-timed prior ‘megastructure’ of the work like the 
plan of an apartment development, each plot to be ‘filled in’ with diverse residents. 
He also saw in it an implicit re-endorsement of classical aria-recitative construction. If 
a European precedent could be found for this form (which possibly Glass would 
deny), it would be the opera-ballet in French theatre from the late baroque to the 
nineteenth century, which interpolated musical dance and vocal numbers in a rather 
casual narrative.  
 In performance Einstein presents three dominant visual motifs on stage: a 
nineteenth century steam train, a courtroom trial which contains a vast bed, and a 





allegorise them thematically: the train might be the triumphalist certainties into which 
Einstein was born but which the theory of relativity overthrew; the trial with its lit de 
justice, (French idiom for ‘seat of justice’) could be the verdict of history on his 
discoveries, which permitted immense sources of both energy and destructive 
power; the spaceship could be that era of exploration for which his physical theories 
enabled reliable mapping of deep space. Wilson merely comments on the spatiality 
of scenes and their motifs, comparing the knee-plays to close-up portraiture, the train 
and trial scenes to middle-distance still-life, and the spaceship ones to distant 
landscape. Just as Einstein abolished the separation of Newton’s absolute ‘space’ 
and ‘time’ to make them into one physical fabric, so Wilson’s different distances 
might entail different time-based experiences.  
 Whilst certain motifs may pertain to Einsteinian theory, this work remains 
hermetic (even an interpreter like Cunningham is hesitant in his readings of any 
decipherable ‘code’). They are embedded in a texture which has its own morphology. 
I shall attempt a drastic synopsis, based on my notes of the 2012 London staging, 
which has minor changes from the 1992 version. I should add that virtually all 
performers are dressed in ‘Einsteinian’ baggy trousers and braces.   
        
Knee Play 1: Two women stenographers count and mime. Chorus chants 
numbers.       
Act 1, Scene 1: The Train’s entry.  Various dance numbers. Man scribbles 
equations; boy throws paper planes. 
Act 1, Scene 2: Trial scene with bed. Beneath hand-less clockface,1 two judges 
and jury (Chorus) try a defendant. An Einstein lookalike plays his violin. 
Knee Play 2: Stenographers reciting again. Einstein plays on, with back-
projected images of him. 
Act 2, 1: In field distant abstract Spaceship hovers above dancers.2 
Act 2, 2: Train reappears, rear carriage facing.3 Victorian couple mime a love 
duet on its balcony. Woman pulls gun on man.   
Knee Play 3: Stenographers at a flashing control panel. Chanting Chorus 
brushes teeth and stick out their tongues.4 
Act 3, 1: Trial and Prison combined.  Two uniformed prisoners perform dejected 
dance. Defendant turns into Patty Hearst, pointing machine-gun.   





Knee Play 4: Stenographers writhe on spotlit glass tables.     
Act 4, 1: Power-station-like building. At window Einstein figure scribbles 
equations before curious crowd. Jazzy saxophone solo.  
Act 4, 2: Organ cadenza, while light box rises like giant clock hand. 
Act 4, 3: Scaffold/spaceship with lit compartments. Two glass cubicles 
containing figures move vertically and across stage. Music intensifies. Two 
plastic bubbles disgorge smoke, and then the stenographers. Front-drop 
descends, inscribed with illustration of A-bomb.  
Knee Play 5: Stenographers sit on park bench. Bus, resembling Train, enters; 
driver recites romantic speech. Words and music cease.  
 
From this sketch of the staging it is evident that these visual motifs have the bizarre, 
intertwined, mutational consistency of a dream, a dream of someone who in waking 
life has been thinking a lot about Einstein. Their combinations through the acts have 
a certain additive development, implying meaning whilst remaining inscrutable. I 
consider that this staging realizes Artaud’s use of fragmented and disconnected 
images in a particularly daring form. The pattern of expectation thereby set up 
creates what I call ‘antiphonal time’: an awaiting of mutually answering, mutating 
items within a hieratic order. Appositely, comparisons with Bach’s church music have 
been made (Cunningham 1999: 156; n. 4: 166), and Glass has cited Monteverdi and 
Palestrina as composers with ‘a different sense of time’ (164); these three produced 
much liturgical music where daily calendrical variations were inserted into fixed, 
expansively treated orders of service. 
 
Such moulding of expectation suggests another comparison with Wagner, with his 
system of musical signifiers, or Leitmotiven, which in the Ring Cycle refer forwards 
and backwards to certain leading themes. Obviously, Glass and Wilson evade such 
codification, but their visual motifs have the presence of potential significance and 
obscure reference. We are presented with a puzzle, an aporia, and so are induced to 
suspend any definite conclusions, to ‘dwell in uncertainties’. 
 Descending to a more detailed level, music and staging, sound and vision, are 
interrelated to the point of exhibiting common features which create a complex 





 Iteration and Mutation. Seventeenth-century Western music developed bar 
lines to facilitate dancing, dividing the musical pulse into equal cells of beats, almost 
always divisible into four, three or two. Glass reacted against this, claiming ‘In the 
West ... we think of music in terms of dividing’. Though minimalist technique might 
seem even more repetitive, he says of Einstein, ‘the difficulty isn’t that it keeps 
repeating, but that it almost never repeats’ (Obenhaus 1985). From Indian music he 
derived (possibly invalidly, as he admits (Tricycle 1999: 318)) what he calls additive 
process, in which a repeated phrase may grow gradually from five, to six, seven, 
eight notes, and then shrink again (Glass, 1995: 58). This subtle fluidity of rhythmic 
structure resists our ingrained expectations of discrete blocks of musical tempi 
connected by modulations; instead, our ‘speed of musical travel’ accelerates and 
decelerates more smoothly, and our sense of duration is moulded in a way 
comparable to how increasingly frequent road stripes before junctions persuade us 
we are driving faster than we are. This technique is reflected in most of the libretto, 
as written by Knowles, where a repeated sentence beginning is progressively added 
to, or completed differently. Similarly, sequences of choreographed gestures grow 
more and then less prolix against a ‘background’ of iterated ones.  
           Alignment and Difference. Glass also developed what he calls cyclic 
structure: superimposing two different rhythmic patterns which progressively diverge 
and then gradually converge again (Glass 1995: 59). The temporal effect could be 
described as ‘planetary’; we are in a system where different sound worlds briefly 
align and then seamlessly move out of phase again. 
 There are also spectacular simultaneous differences of speed between 
torrential musical passages, accompanying stage action and spoken text. This for 
me is the central temporal presentation of the work. Whilst the music rushes by in 
what seem to be phrases of twenty to twenty-eight rapid notes, some dancers will 
gyrate ‘in time’, whilst others’ formalistic slow motion takes each of these phrases as 
a single beat, with recited text syncopating between them. We are familiar with 
cinematic ‘slo-mo’, making fast actions  super-slow to heighten scenes like gunfights 
and deaths, but this is more complex; we have two extremes of time, mediated by, to 
use Glass’s words, the ‘colloquial time’ of repeated text. The effect of this is 
analogous to action replays in sports broadcasting; the corner stopwatch flickers by, 
counting hundredths of a second, while the foul or disputed finish is repeated frame 





defamiliarization device, making the stage action not present to us, but as if it is 
already recollected by us, an item of memory or dream. The visual array of the 
staging reflects this too: figures wearing ‘retro’ braces move like marionettes in some 
giant glockenspiel clock, like some animated version of paintings by the Scottish 
artists James Pryde or Stephen Conroy.  
 Irresolution and Kicking. Glass wished to develop a way of using harmony that 
fitted with his rhythmic methods. In Einstein he used varieties of what could be called 
‘unsatisfied cadences’ where the resolution in a phrase is lower than Western ears 
would expect, changing its key structure and creating an expectation of resolution 
‘next time round’. This is exploited in repeated phrases that in sequence can last up 
to eight minutes (Glass 1995: 60); the phrase, so to speak, ‘kicks on’ into its 
repetition. Similarly, he subverts our conditioned expectations, mentioned above, of 
even-numbered time signatures, by using five or seven beat phrases which leave us 
waiting for the ‘closing’ beat, and so surprise us with the next phrase. Appropriating a 
classical rhetorical term, both these devices instantiate anacoluthon, a piling of one 
incomplete clause on another, making the musical texture seem to race to catch-up 
with the time it occupies. 
 
 
 These devices permit a subtle, constant pattern of mutation within the musical 
and dramatic texture of the work, thereby, as Wilson said recently, ‘stretching’ or 
‘compressing’ time. The New York critic Andrew Porter observes of Einstein that our 
initial ‘rebellion at the-needle-stuck-in-the-groove quality’ dissolves when realizing 
that ‘the needle has not stuck’ and, citing repetitively structured works by Satie or 
Stockhausen, discerns an appetite for ‘slow-shifting, chronic experiences – 
hypnotized by repetition, stimulated by ... tiny changes’ (Roddy, 1999: 172-173). We 
could consider our experience of time-based media as being like mentally riding a 
wave of ‘present’ stimulation, which carries with it an integral but progressively fading 
‘tail’ of memory of its immediate past, and which also projects an array of 
expectations for its immediate future (upon this latter, of course, Derrida’s notion of 
differance is derived). Applying Porter’s ‘chronic experiences’ to such a model, we 
can say that our ‘tail of memory’ here is initially of ‘straight’ iterative sequences, 
resisting attentiveness, but that we then intuit a contour of development ‘curving 





to speak, in a different place ourselves and therefore respond differently to it. I would 
call this experience one of spiral or even helical time; in both music and staging, we 
are going round and round, but travelling somewhere new. 
 I have previously paraphrased Glass’s and Wilson’s vision of the relation 
between work and audience as being one of hermeneutic convergence, where the 
time taken to interpret is integral to its duration. The above-mentioned ‘tail of 
memory’ becomes  necessary condition for a further process of ruminating content, 
which, searching for meanings, ‘spreads out’ such a time-based work as one 
‘simultaneous’ landscape. In Western tradition, this landscape, as mentioned, 
punctuated by climaxes, crises and resolutions, attracts conclusive (not necessarily 
narrative) interpretations rapidly. In Einstein the dune-like shifts of visual and aural 
near-similarities do not; whatever conjectures we apply are unproven, and cannot 
serve as convenient, portable maps.  In this way ‘interpreting time’ is indeed fused 
with ‘performed’ time. And there is a pleasing analogical association to be made 
between the two. In seeking to capture the effect of interpreting artefacts in all 
media, Heidegger enunciates the notion of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ (1978: 195), or 
‘interpretive spiral’ (Broadhurst, 1999: 38) by which at each turn of rumination on  
content, fresh insights are produced, without any fresh matter emerging, nor any 
conclusion to end future and further turns. I suggest that, in a conspicuous way, 
Einstein serves as a trap for such helical exegesis; it is a ‘happening’ in process 
which elicits new insights at every stage of its duration (see Broadhurst, 1999: 172-
3). I think it does so by manipulating what Heidegger called the ‘hermeneutical 
situation’ of an audience: we approach the work ‘fore-having’ (in his lexicon of terms, 
see Heidegger, 1978:190-1) a range of traditional meanings for operatic work, but 
our ‘fore-sight’, our choice between any one of these genre-based interpretive 
routes, is continually thwarted by its aporetic character, and so our ‘fore-conception’, 
our resolved pursuit of a particular route, is always blocked. We are forced to 
improvise and (taking this word in its strict meaning) to ex-temporise, to find a 
solution ‘out of time’.  
 Of course Heidegger’s spiral analogizes the discontinuous but repeated 
revisiting of the ‘same’ work, each encounter yielding more inferences. But, for 
example, though we may see King Lear numerous times, each occasion disclosing 
new facets, the change of fortunes of the characters remains the same. The 





irrevocable. A work like Einstein, however, has no such one-directional transitivity. Its 
end could as well signify a new beginning; nothing has changed for its ‘protagonists’ 
(if one can call them such). Rather like those progressive rock tracks which fade in 
and then fade out, Einstein seems to hint that the whole work is just part of a huge 
perpetuum mobile (‘forever in motion’) extending beyond itself.  
 From this, my final thoughts on temporal effect invoke that loose bundle of 
notions expounded by Nietzsche and subsequently called his ‘theory’ of Eternal 
Recurrence.5 Even Nietzsche scholars struggle to defend its coherence, but at its 
core lies a rejection of an ‘end of time’, both in simple duration but also in terms of 
telos, transcendent purpose. Modern ‘Big-Bang’ astrophysics finds finite duration not 
so inconceivable, Einstein’s conception of space-time making such a position 
tenable. But the absence of teleology is something that harmonizes with both the 
form and content of this work. In form Einstein’s lack of narrative development 
makes its duration (unlike that of King Lear), eminently reversible; there is no 
graspable end-state to be reached. Nietzsche extended his speculation to 
postulating that each of us would effectively re-live our lives forever, and that the 
only affirmative response was that of amor fati: to assent to, to love this fate 
(Nietzsche 1979: 67-68). Beneath the strange clumps of images that inhabit Einstein 
there is a sense-in-nonsense that it symbolically portrays a life, in which the historical 
Einstein knew he had discovered such morally ambivalent sources of power, but 
nevertheless one which he himself would have willed to repeat.   
 
Notes 
1. Wilson uses here a variety of instruments for time measurement (See Brecht 
1978: 330). 
2. Allusion to solar eclipse of 1919, where appearance of two adjacent stars 
demonstrated  curvature of space, supporting Einsteinian Relativity. 
3. Probably allusion to Einstein’s thought-experiment regarding the slowing of time 
relative to speed (Cunningham 1999:158). 
4. Reference to a famous press photograph of Einstein sticking his tongue out. 
5. Initially expressed in The Gay Science and developed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
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